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Education markets and school segregation: a mechanism-based explanation 
Education markets have spread worldwide over the past few decades. Frequently, the 
expansion of markets in education is presented by their promoters as a means to 
improve the opportunities of the most socioeconomically disadvantaged students. 
However, the evidence available shows that market-oriented policies that enhance 
competition and choice tend to produce negative effects on equity by boosting school 
segregation and social stratification among public and private schools. This paper aims 
to unpack the mechanisms through which market-oriented policies and the 
involvement of private actors in education can foster the uneven distribution of 
students from disadvantaged backgrounds. By using a mechanism-based explanation, 
this paper identifies and describes the functioning of three main mechanisms by which 
pro-market policies generate school segregation. Finally, the paper addresses the 
analytical benefits of the mechanism-based approach and reflects on its policy 
implications regarding market-oriented reforms in education. 
Keywords: social mechanisms, education markets, school segregation, educational 
inequalities, privatisation.  
Introduction 
Despite the existence and persistence of advocates of the virtues of privatisation and market systems 
of provision of education, there is a growing body of evidence for the negative effects of education 
markets on equity. A large number of national case studies (Bonal and Bellei, 2018; Macpherson, 
Robertson and Walford 2014) and international comparisons (OECD 2019, 2012; Alegre and Ferrer 
2010) provide further evidence that processes of choice and competition in education tend to 
undermine equality of opportunities, increase performance inequalities and trigger school 
segregation. Of course, these effects differ in their form and intensity. Market mechanisms in 
education are far from being homogenous and may take different forms (e.g., vouchers, charter 
schools, subsidies), as well as include different levels of public intervention to compensate for market 
failure (Lubienski 2006). The social context and the policy design modulate both the potential and the 
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real effects of market mechanisms on equity. The two main policies by which market systems of 
provision impact on education equity, choice and competition, are diversely promoted and regulated 
in different education systems. While some education systems are close to what could be understood 
as ‘pure markets’ (Chile, for instance), others allow for choice under conditions of gratuity (e.g., the 
Netherlands) and others restrict choice by using catchment areas to ensure proximity and equal 
opportunities (e.g., Spain).  
Interestingly, the diversity of policy designs under which mechanisms of choice and 
competition take place do not seem to alter the direction of their effects on inequalities and school 
segregation. In other words, despite a theory of change that foresees equity gains associated with 
market-oriented reforms, there is no consistent empirical evidence in support of such positive effects. 
Policies designed to increase equity by means of more choice and school competition frequently run 
in direct contradiction with actors’ responses, which do not react as the theory of change predicts. 
There are different theoretical approaches and empirical studies that give us answers to the reasons 
why market systems of provision and funding in education generate negative effects. For instance, 
bounded rationality approach (Ben-Porath 2009; Bonal and Zancajo, 2018) points out that families’ 
and students’ school choices are not necessarily only oriented to maximise the level of educational 
quality but mediated and restricted by their social and economic conditions. Other authors consider 
that social class significantly influences the capacity of families to interpret information and to make 
choices, which in some cases leads to characterise some working-class families as ‘disconnected 
parents’ (Gewirtz, Ball and Bowe 1995). There are also approaches that emphasise how schools’ logics 
of action in the education market can trigger the development of opportunistic behaviours, such as 
students’ selection or exclusion (van Zanten, 2009b).  Despite their analytical relevance, these 
theoretical approaches focus on one side of education markets, either demand or supply, but do not 
explore how both sides interact to produce school segregation. 
The diversity regarding the drivers of school segregation does not open the black box between 
market reforms and school segregation. Beyond the collection of case studies or multilevel statistical 
analyses showing a positive relationship between privatisation and segregation, we know little about 
how these effects are specifically generated. Processes by which these effects take place are either 
excluded or taken for granted in a number of studies assessing the impact of school choice or 
privatisation on inequalities (Elacqua, 2012; Garcia 2008; Dronkers and Avram, 2012).  
In this paper, we argue that mechanism-based explanations, currently widely discussed in the 
social sciences, is a useful approach to open the black box between education markets and school 
segregation. A mechanism-based explanation, as Gundersen (2018) argues, ‘is a model which 
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describes interacting parts in order to show how a phenomenon is generated’ (p.37). Social-
mechanisms explanations search for regularities that connect structural elements and circumstances 
to actors’ responses. Different sets of institutional and social conditions generate particular actors’ 
responses that produce specific outcomes, in this case, school segregation.  
In the field of pro-market policies in education, the mechanism-based explanations can 
contribute decisively to understanding how these policies work. While quantitative studies focusing 
on the relationship between school choice, private schools and education inequalities have used 
comparative strategies to interpret results from a probabilistic perspective (Alegre and Ferrer 2010, 
Dronkers and Avram 2012), qualitative case studies rarely overcome their contextual embeddedness 
and are unable to identify regularities that could have explanatory capacity for different contexts 
(Bosetti and Prytt 2007; Bell 2009). Interestingly, the exception to this rule is usually given by those 
authors that have used systematic reviews to identify mechanisms of production and reproduction of 
inequalities (Waslander, Pater and Weide 2010). While these reviews inform about how inequalities 
are produced, they do not attempt to theorise about the relationship between the social contexts of 
education markets and processes that translate specific social action into education inequalities. 
Mechanisms-based explanations may help us to understand why specific individual actions appear in 
specific contexts and why they produce specific effects. In this article, we make use of James 
Coleman’s theory of social action and his typology of social mechanism to show how this connection 
operates in the field of education markets and school segregation (Coleman 1986).  
This paper proposes a conceptual and systematic approach to understanding the mechanisms 
that link education privatisation and pro-market policies to school segregation. In the next section, we 
review the main evidence regarding the relationship between education markets and school 
segregation. The third section focuses on mechanism-based explanations in the social sciences and 
their limited use in education policy studies. The fourth section describes these three mechanisms and 
illustrates their functioning based on the evidence provided by different case studies. The last section 
elaborates on the theoretical and policy implications of the mechanism-based approach.  
Market mechanisms and school segregation  
Beyond the particular case of the United States, school segregation has only become a source of 
concern in many education systems over the last few decades. The increasing number of international 
comparisons, mainly related to the emergence of international large-scale assessments like PISA, have 
generated a growing interest in and concern for school segregation (OECD 2012; Alegre and Ferrer 
2010). Although it is well-known that school segregation is influenced by a diverse range of non-
 4 
educational factors (e.g., residential segregation, demographic trends or migration waves, etc.), the 
research has also shown how educational institutional settings can play an important role in affecting 
school segregation. Among educational factors, the role of market policies fostering or reducing the 
uneven distribution of pupils, has attracted great interest in the academic literature and the policy 
debate.  
Market mechanisms in education are frequently presented by their advocates as an effective 
policy option to improve educational opportunities and reduce school segregation (Musset 2012). 
Despite the diversity of market-oriented reforms, advocates of these policies consider them as a way 
to overcome school segregation generated by traditionally bureaucratic regimes of schooling. For 
instance, Tooley (1996) affirms that state intervention tends to create inequalities because ‘they are 
an inevitable consequence of the middle classes “muscling in” on welfare, using the state to provide 
for their needs, at the expense of the poor’ (p. 63). From this point of view, it is expected that market 
mechanisms will contribute to levelling the playing field, equalising the opportunities of 
socioeconomically affluent and disadvantaged students (Moe 2008).  
The claims of pro-market policy advocates regarding the desegregation capacity of these 
policies are sustained by a particular theory of change regarding the relationship between market-
oriented policies and school segregation, which is based on the functioning of two main associations. 
The first one refers to the capacity of school choice to facilitate overcoming residential segregation. It 
is assumed that increasing families’ capacity to choose will allow poor populations to exercise an ‘exit’ 
(Hirschmann 1970) from their neighbourhood schools (which are usually assumed to be low quality 
schools) and access schools previously restricted to them because of economic barriers, geographical 
allocation or restrictive catchment areas (Hoxby 2003). Pro-market advocates consider that families 
will choose schools based on instrumental rationality and trying to maximise the educational quality 
obtained (Bonal and Zancajo 2018b). The second association is related to the capacity of education 
markets to foster competition between schools. Frequently, choice and per capita funding schemes 
increase the need for schools to attract demand as a way to ensure the viability of the market (Belfield 
and Levin 2002). With respect to school segregation, it is assumed that low-quality schools, usually 
with a high concentration of socioeconomically disadvantaged students, will be forced to exit the 
market due to the lack of demand (Chubb and Moe 1990). Education market advocates consider that 
socioeconomically disadvantaged students, in particular, will benefit from this market turnover since 
they are more likely to attend schools with low levels of performance.  
However, empirical evidence has consistently shown that market mechanisms and 
privatisation policies tend to increase school segregation. From a comparative point of view Alegre 
 5 
and Ferrer (2010) show how OECD education systems where market policies and private provision 
play a significant role, tend to have higher levels of school segregation. Similarly, OECD (2012) 
estimates that countries with universal or targeted vouchers have higher levels of social stratification 
among schools than education systems without these financing schemes. In addition, a recent OECD 
study shows that those education systems that have weakened the link between place of residence 
and school allocation, therefore giving more prominence to school choice, have a higher level of 
socioeconomic school segregation (OECD 2019). In the case of analyses conducted within the same 
national context, Valenzuela, Bellei and de los Ríos (2014) conclude that those municipalities in Chile 
with higher levels of private provision tend to be more socioeconomically segregated. Different 
studies have shown how the adoption of pro-market reforms that increase school choice and school 
competition have led to an expansion of school segregation in contexts such as Chile (Hsieh and 
Urquiola 2006; Elacqua 2012), New Zealand (Fiske and Ladd 2000) or Sweden (Böhlmark and Lindahl 
2007).  
As Waslander et al. (2010) point out, studies showing a positive effect of privatisation and pro-
market policies on school segregation are almost non-existent. Similarly, Musset (2012) reviews the 
existing evidence on the effect of school choice on school segregation, concluding that all the studies 
find that school segregation by race or socioeconomic status increases as a consequence of pro-choice 
policy reforms (p. 35). However, some studies indicate that the adoption of privatisation and market 
policies in education has not affected school segregation significantly. This is the case of Gorard, Fitz 
and Taylor (2001), who conclude that pro-market reforms adopted in England did not lead to a 
significant variation in the level of school segregation. In the case of the US, some studies have shown 
that expanding school choice has increased the racial and social diversity of charter schools, but have 
not examined their general effects on the segregation of the whole local education market (Garcia, 
2008; Ritter et al., 2016).  
What the vast majority of the evidence suggests is that there is a strong positive relationship 
between education markets and school segregation. However, less is known about how this 
relationship operates. Actors’ beliefs, expectations and actions produce effects that differ significantly 
from those expected by the advocates of the virtues of education markets. However, proving and 
verifying the gap between theory and practice does not tell us why this happens. What mediates 
between the existence of specific systems of market provision of education and the actors’ responses 
to produce school segregation? Social mechanism-based explanations can provide answers to these 
questions.  
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Social-mechanism-based explanations and education policy effects: a methodology 
Over the last few decades, social mechanisms have received significant attention in the social sciences. 
Social scientists have tried to develop mechanism-based explanations that aim to overcome either 
covering-law accounts or purely co-variation between variables. Although there are several definitions 
of social mechanisms in the literature, the basis of the concept is as simple as Elster’s idea ‘that proper 
explanations should detail the cogs and wheels of the causal process through which the outcome to 
be explained was brought about’ (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010, 50).  
Thus, mechanism-based explanations aim to open the black box that normally connects 
different inputs with specific outcomes or effects. They aim to distinguish spurious from real 
associations and ‘provide deeper, more direct, and more fine-grained explanations’ (Hedström and 
Swedberg 1996, 288). The very idea of causality associated with mechanisms is the basis for 
understanding that mechanisms are generative, that is, they include the why of the relationship 
between entities, something that cannot be captured even by sophisticated statistical models 
(Boudon 1979). Social mechanisms are also characterised as having a structure, for acting with 
regularity in the production of a specific effect, which allows the black box to be turned into a 
transparent box and makes visible how the interacting entities produce a particular outcome 
(Hedström and Ylikoski 2010, 51; Little 2011, 277).  
Interestingly enough, the structural regularity that characterises social mechanisms can only 
be achieved by capturing ‘the interests, identities, networks, allies and repertoires’ of the actions of 
purposive agents (Little 2011, 277). Therefore, observing social action is a necessary condition for 
grasping the structural mechanisms that produce specific social effects in specific circumstances.  
The use of mechanism-based explanations in education policy studies has not proliferated as 
an alternative approach to either statistical probability-based explanations or ethnographic and cases 
study accounts. The most salient example of the use of a mechanism-based understanding of 
education policy was provided by Dale (1999). In a context of rapid transformations caused by 
globalisation, Dale tries to understand the causal links between globalisation and specific national 
education policies. Beyond the interest of his object of study, there are two methodological aspects 
of Dale’s approach that are noteworthy. The first refers to the non-neutrality of the mechanism to 
understand the nature of the effects it produces.  
Linked to this idea, the second salient aspect of Dale’s approach is his focus on the variables 
that differentiate the mechanisms themselves. Dale identifies a set of dimensions that help us to 
understand why a specific mechanism appears and produces a certain effect. Aspects such as the type 
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of power of the agents of globalisation, their scope of intervention or their explicit or implicit mandate 
are aspects that generate different types of effects. It is then the confluence of these characteristics 
that allows him to identify the structural regularities that a specific mechanism incorporates. These 
dimensions of variability can be understood as the ‘specific circumstances’ operating in social reality 
that explain the particularities of the mechanisms to produce specific effects. 
An interesting alternative analytical and methodological perspective to understand the 
unobservable aspects that shape these mechanisms is provided by Hedström and Swedberg (1996). 
Based on James Coleman’s theory of social action and his macro-micro-macro model, these authors 
differentiate three types of mechanism that occur between macro states. Structural or macro 
elements set the conditions for the emergence of ‘individual desires, beliefs, and action opportunities’ 
(Hedström and Swedberg 1996, 297) that generate specific actions inspired in these values and 
opportunities at the micro level. The aggregate of individual actions produces a collective action, 
sometimes unintended or unexpected, that is transformed into a collective outcome at the macro 
level. The authors call these three steps situational, individual action and transformational 
mechanisms. 
Figure 1 adapts Coleman’s model to our object of study. In our analysis, we depart from the 
existence of education markets as a macro state. Specific policy/institutional designs that characterise 
the operation of these educational markets may generate specific individual responses. For instance, 
actors at the demand side may activate strategies of exit from public schools or may develop strategies 
of social closure to avoid the entrance of disadvantaged students. From the supply side, schools’ 
selection processes act as entrance barriers for certain students or schools use innovation and 
differentiation in order to attract the best students. In the end, aggregate individual actions produce 
a collective outcome (school segregation) at the macro level (which can be unexpected and 
unintended).  
Figure 1. Mechanisms of school segregation, based on James Coleman’s model (Coleman 1986, 
cited in Hendström and Swedberg 1996: 297). 
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The institutional design that regulates the presence of educational markets produces different 
situational mechanisms. Education markets may have different regulations and might stress more 
school choice, school competition or both. Depending on this institutional design, different situational 
mechanisms can be activated and generate different expectations and action opportunities for 
individual actors. Actors may react by escaping from public schools that have a high number of socially 
disadvantaged students, choosing schools based on pedagogic identities or trying to select upper class 
students. These actions taken together are the transformation mechanism by which school 
segregation is produced.  
 In this article, we use the analytical model developed by Hedström and Swedberg (1996) to 
understand the mechanisms that link the operation of different types of education markets to school 
segregation. We argue that the type of institutional design generates different types of actors’ 
responses that have an impact on school segregation.  
Education markets and school segregation: generative mechanisms 
Mechanism 1: Enhancing white flight 
The first situational mechanism operating at a macro level by which education markets affect school 
segregation is school choice. Policy designs that allow for absolute or significant levels of choice open 
the possibility of opting out of local schools and neighbourhoods. Thus, the situational mechanism of 
school choice facilitates the emergence of white flight as an individual action mechanism that is 
transformed into processes of school segregation.  
The term white flight was coined in the 1950s and 1960s in the US to refer to the process of 
an exodus of white people from areas with higher levels of ethnic or racial concentration. Busing 
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policies in the wake of the Supreme Court’s sentence on Brown vs. the Board of Education, led many 
middle-class white families to move out of areas that received minority students (Ravitch 1983). Since 
then, the term white flight has travelled beyond the US and is currently used to refer to movement of 
native families out of local schools and neighbourhoods that have an increasing migrant population. 
The higher the residential segregation of migrants in specific neighbourhoods, the higher the 
probability of native middle-class families opting out of local schools. While most of the literature on 
white flight evidence focuses on racial segregation (Sikkink and Emerson 2008; Fairlie 2002), other 
studies have measured the same process referring to social composition of neighbourhoods or schools 
(Kye 2018; Cullen, Jacob and Levitt 2005). Qualitative analyses that have explored parental 
preferences find that choice opportunities activate the search for socially or racially homogeneous 
environments (Bagley 1996; Billingham and Hunt 2016). 
White flight processes do not necessarily have to be related to the presence of private 
providers, but instead with families’ capacity of choice. Indeed, white flight exists because the 
perception of risk attached to enrolling children in areas or schools with a high concentration of 
migrant students, incentivises the search for alternatives. However, the more opportunities the 
system provides to opt out of local schools, the higher the probability that native or middle-class 
families move from their place of residence to alternative neighbourhoods and schools. A recent OECD 
report highlights that those systems that have reduced the role of proximity in school admission 
policies have significantly increased inequalities of access and generated processes of school 
segregation by social status or student’s nationality (OECD 2019). Moreover, other institutional 
designs such as per capita funding schemes or charter schools are also generators of more choice 
opportunities without necessarily changing school choice regulations (Brunner, Imazeki and Ross 
2010; Garcia 2008). The strong link between higher levels of choice and school segregation has been 
evidenced in countries such as Sweden (Böhlmark, Holmlund and Lindahl 2016), the Netherlands 
(Boterman 2013), Chile (Elacqua 2012), Spain (Bonal, Zancajo and Scandurra 2019) and the US 
(Saporito 2003). While market advocates argue that school choice opens up the possibility for poor 
families to escape from low quality neighbourhood schools and get into higher quality schools 
(Merrifield 2001). Most of the empirical evidence illustrates that ‘native’ and middle-class families 
present higher levels of mobility which in turn generates higher levels of inequality and segregation 
(Waslander et al. 2010; Musset 2012). A number of studies have shown that poor families are not able 
to enact school choice as market theory expects. The lack of access to relevant information or the 
necessary skills to interpret it are the basis to explain why low-income families show different patterns 
of choice compared to middle-class families in most of the cases (Gewirtz, Ball and Bowe 1995). At the 
same time, the lack of high-quality schooling options in an accessible geographical distance or the fact 
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that poor families prioritise other choice criteria (e.g., safety, discipline or individual attention for their 
children) rather than academic performance, explain why a higher capacity of choice does not 
necessarily result into the access to higher quality schooling options, which in turn, triggers school 
segregation (Elacqua, Schneider and Buckley, 2006; Bonal, Verger and Zancajo 2017; Stewart and 
Wolf, 2014).  
The relationship between privatisation and migrant concentration is twofold. As market-
oriented education policies increase the possibility to opt out of local schools, several authors have 
pointed out that a higher concentration of migrant or ethnic minority students in certain schools 
increases the demand for private schooling (Betts and Fairlie 2003; Saporito and Sohoni 2006). 
Interestingly, the mechanism of white flight seems to channel both the effects of education markets 
on segregation processes as well as the effects of higher segregation on increasing demand for private 
enrolment. 
In education systems with a significantly diverse private sector, choice strategies for private 
schools increase the process of polarisation and school segregation. The Chilean case is clearly 
paradigmatic in this regard. Santos and Elacqua (2016) compare socioeconomic school segregation in 
public, private subsidised and independent private schools in the metropolitan area of Santiago. They 
show how parental preferences and economic barriers to access to private schools increase the 
homogeneity of school composition. The higher the presence of private schools that practice 
academic selectivity and have a high fee, the higher the difference between observed segregation and 
counterfactual proximity-based segregation. In the case of Spain, Bonal and Zancajo (2018) found that 
private subsidised schools receive significantly more students than public schools from families who 
opt out of their catchment area.  
In summary, policy designs that allow for choice stimulate processes of white flight by the 
actors that predominantly produce school segregation. Although possibilities of choice and mobility 
for all families are formally equal, middle-class families are far more active in flying from areas or 
schools with a high proportion of disadvantaged students. Likewise, education markets facilitate white 
flight by expanding school supply.  
Mechanism 2: Boosting social closure 
The second mechanism refers to processes of social closure that are induced by market-oriented 
policies. This mechanism refers to the capacity of education markets to trigger the concentration of 
socially homogenous populations in specific schools. In this case, two situational mechanisms at the 
macro level are the initiators of this process. First, school choice schemes that increase the number of 
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schooling options for families and second, the high level of autonomy and incentives given to 
education providers for diversification creating market niches aimed at certain families. These two 
situational mechanisms facilitate specific actions at both the demand and the supply side. 
In the case of the demand side, housing markets and school choice create the conditions for 
activating social closure as a possible response to avoid the risk of attending a low performing school. 
Several studies have shown how choice patterns of the middle classes are affected by the changing 
conditions of housing and the production of specific circuits of schooling (Butler and Robson 2003; 
Ball, Bowe and Gewirtz 1995). Studies in geography of education have demonstrated how residential 
and school choices are mutually related. School choice is spatially contingent but also residential 
choices are conditioned by school choice opportunities (Pearman and Swain 2017). Interestingly, the 
rise in gentrification processes in many cities may simultaneously activate processes of white flight 
and strategies of social closure in local schools (Ichou and van Zanten 2019; Maloutas 2007). Agnès 
van Zanten (2009a) has used the term ‘colonisation’ to refer to processes of social closure of local 
schools by families with high levels of cultural capital, but with insufficient economic capital to opt for 
private schools. Interestingly, while open school choice may facilitate processes of white flight, 
processes of colonisation may be more frequently activated by school choice restrictions, or by 
processes of urban gentrification, where higher levels of social mixture can incentivise processes of 
differentiation by ensuring a homogeneous social composition of the school.  
Social closure may sometimes be a conscious process of attracting middle-class families and 
excluding low-income families. Advantaged parents who often play the role of careful investors, can 
become a source of value to the school and marginalise socially disadvantaged families (Freidus 2019).  
Social closure may also occur in those situations in which progressive middle-class families aim to 
transform a previously segregated and marginalised school into a diverse one. Attempts to improve 
the conditions of ‘gentrified’ schools do not occur without conflict as middle-class parents can make 
themselves heard and have the cultural resources to fight for a better school. These attempts may 
generate processes of exclusion and reduce the sense of belonging felt by low-income families (Siegel-
Hawley Thachik and Bridges 2016, Posey-Maddox 2014). While choosing a local school is usually 
justified by middle class parents as opting for staying in the neighbourhood and being involved in the 
community, strategies of school closure actually show that middle-class parents ‘espouse a politically 
progressive ideology but act in their own self-interest’ (Roberts and Lake 2016, 215). Parents mobilise 
their social networks to either choose the ‘best’ public schools of the neighbourhood or to monopolise 
local schools and engage in their transformation, in many occasions excluding low income families 
living in the area (Butler 2003). Both options may result in increasing processes of school segregation. 
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Beyond the key role of the demand side to boost processes of social closure, providers can 
also contribute decisively to increase the social or ethnic isolation of some social groups. The capacity 
of educational providers to trigger social closure is explained by the need for schools to create specific 
‘market-niches’ (Jabbar 2015) as a means of responding to the incentives of competitive 
environments. As Levin (1991) points out, education markets incentivise schools to differentiate their 
educational approach to meet the preferences of specific families and attract demand. At the same 
time, this facilitates families to ‘choose schools according to their own cultural, academic, social, 
political, ethnic, racial and religious values’ (p.148).  
While the capacity of families to choose based on their values or orientations can have 
positive effects in meeting the demands and the needs of minority groups, the need for schools to 
meet specific educational demands can also have the unintended consequence of reinforcing 
processes of social closure, and therefore segregation. As the evidence has shown, school choice 
preferences are highly socially mediated (Schneider, Teske and Marschall 2000), and schools’ 
differentiation strategies can reinforce social closure because they can appeal to the choice criteria of 
specific social groups. As different studies recognise, there is an evident trade-off between the 
diversity of the educational system and the capacity to ensure a balanced social distribution of the 
students (OECD 2017; OECD 2019). Frequently, the use of symbolic attributes by schools as part of the 
differentiation strategy increases their capacity to attract families from specific social groups. 
Likewise, the use of symbols, values or cultural codes of the middle and upper classes act as a 
mechanism of self-exclusion for those groups from a different social background who do not identify 
with these codes (Zancajo 2019). In some contexts, the choice of religious schools by some social 
groups is guided by the desire to avoid socioeconomic integration rather than by educational 
preferences (Harel Ben Shahar and Berger 2018; Meure 2004). Beyond the unintended consequences 
of diversification, evidence shows how some schools explicitly use differentiation as a way to influence 
the social background of their potential applicants or to foster processes of social closure (Zancajo 
2019; Lubienski 2006).  
Sometimes the school composition becomes an attribute of diversification itself. Schools use 
the advantaged social composition of their school population to attract new demand (Fiske and Ladd 
2000; Maroy 2004). This phenomenon relies on the fact that for many families, schools’ composition 
is one of the main criteria of choice and most socially advantaged schools try to attract them by 
ensuring a certain level of social closure. This situation by which schools diversify themselves based 
on the socioeconomic background of their population is what Lubienski (2006) denominates vertical 
diversification. As studies in different contexts have shown, in education markets vertical 
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diversification or hierarchisation is a more common phenomenon than diversification based on 
pedagogical or curricular approaches (Kosunen and Carrasco 2016; Maroy 2004; Jabbar 2015).  
In summary, processes of social closure that lead to school segregation can be triggered from 
both demand and supply sides. Indeed, strategies developed by families and schools can reinforce 
each other. Families trying to achieve certain levels of social closure indirectly induce schools to 
develop diversification strategies aligned with particular social class codes. At the same time, schools 
developing social-class differentiation strategies may channel specific family preferences.  
Mechanism 3: Incentivising student selection 
The third mechanism is the trend of the education market to incentivise educational providers to 
develop practices of student selection and therefore, foster processes of school segregation. 
Education markets are frequently characterised by some form of public funding scheme that follows 
the demand either to state or private schools. This funding scheme is expected to increase families’ 
capacity to choose, as well as setting up the necessary incentives for schools to attract as much 
demand as possible. Likewise, pro-market policies are frequently accompanied by accountability 
devices and school choice information systems that emphasise the importance of academic 
performance. The combination of per capita funding schemes and accountability policies acts as a 
situational mechanism. As a result of this situational mechanism, schools tend to develop an individual 
action mechanism that consists of selecting the most academically able students or those from the 
most advantaged backgrounds. The development of practices of student selection results in a 
transformational mechanism that increases school segregation.  
The theory of change of pro-market policies predicts that per capita funding schemes and 
accountability policies will encourage schools to improve the quality of their educational service 
(Chubb and Moe 1990). However, research in different contexts has shown how frequently schools 
enact these incentives screening the ablest students instead of increasing the quality of the service 
(Lubienski, Weitzel and Lubienski 2009). This response enables schools to improve their position in 
the education market without necessarily developing better educational practices which are often 
more costly, risky and challenging to implement (Adnett 2004).  
In competitive environments, the trend for schools to attract and enrol the most academically 
able students has been conceptualised as the ‘second-order’ of competition’ in contrast with the ‘first-
order’, which refers to the attempt to recruit as much demand as possible (van Zanten 2009b). 
Second-order competition usually takes place under three main schools’ logics of action. First, because 
most academically able students are ‘less costly’ to educate, this allows schools to reduce the cost of 
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their operation (Ball 1993), as well as increasing their academic performance and their position in the 
market without increasing their instruction quality (Bellei 2007). When schools are not able to 
measure the performance or the academic ability of students, particularly at an early age, they use 
the economic background of the applicants as a predictor of their future performance. Second, 
accountability systems based on the students’ academic performance incentivise student selection as 
a means of ensuring good performance in standardised tests (Waslander et al. 2010). Third, as has 
been previously argued, the profile of the student body plays a significant role in attracting demand. 
In the context of school choice, parents frequently use the student academic profile as a proxy for 
school quality (Schneider, Elacqua and Buckley 2006). Therefore, schools able to concentrate more 
academically able students are more likely to increase their capacity to attract new demand, 
particularly from the middle and upper-middle social class (Ladd 2002).  
As would be expected, student selection practices are particularly prevalent in those 
education markets where they are legally permitted and where performance assessments play an 
important role as accountability devices or/and as information systems for school choice (Boeskens 
2016; Hart and Figlio 2015). For example, in Chile, where school rankings based on academic 
performance have been actively disseminated as a source of information for school choice, student 
selection practices are very common, particularly among private subsidised schools, despite being 
formally prohibited by law (Contreras, Sepúlveda and Bustos 2010). Carrasco, Gutierrez, and Flores 
(2017) show how schools frequently use different methods and instruments to screen applicants, 
including entrance exams or play sessions. These practices are not only oriented to assess the current 
academic level of the new applicants, but also their potential performance (Zancajo 2017). In New 
Zealand, the provision for schools to establish admission plans if they reached a certain level of 
demand, significantly increased instances of student selection (Wylie 2006; Fiske and Ladd 2000).  
The impact of selection practices goes beyond school segregation and also affects the 
performance inequality between public and private schools. Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) show how the 
performance advantage of private schools in Chile is clearly related to their student selection practices 
rather than to their supposed better education. Likewise, Boeskens (2016) affirms that the process of 
‘cream-skimming’ is one of the mechanisms that explains the frequent social stratification between 
public and private subsidised schools in many education markets.   
In the case of those education markets where selection practices are prohibited, the 
prevalence of student screening has been reported to be lower. However, in some contexts where 
student selection is formally prohibited for schools receiving public funding (e.g., Spain) some studies 
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have reported the presence of selective admissions in some private subsidised schools (Alegre et al. 
2010; Valiente 2008; Maroy, 2004).  
Beyond direct practices of student screening, in some cases, schools develop more subtle or 
soft devices to promote processes of self-selection. For example, practices such as differentiation or 
marketing are carried out under the logic of student selection or have direct effects on it. Frequently, 
differentiation or marketing strategies play an important role in attracting socioeconomically 
advantaged families and students, as well as in fostering processes of auto-exclusion from other social 
groups. In the case of charter schools in the US or in Chile, some studies have shown how marketing 
strategies developed by schools are not only oriented to attract specific groups of students, but also 
discourage the access of socioeconomically disadvantaged or minority students (Wilson and Carlsen 
2016; Jabbar 2016; Zancajo 2018; Jabbar 2015). Schools can choose to advertise themselves only in 
local spaces where middle-class families live or they can avoid advertising themselves in specific areas, 
a phenomenon that Jabbar (2015) defines as a ‘not marketing’ form of selection (p. 19).  
As it has been shown in this section, the capacity of education markets to encourage student 
selection has direct effects on students sorting. The fact that private subsidised schools are more likely 
to develop these practices, contributes to the increase in the social stratification between public and 
private providers and fosters school segregation (Boeskens 2016). The evidence also shows that the 
‘cream-skimming’ developed by private subsidised schools tends to increase the concentration of less 
academically able or socioeconomically disadvantaged students in public schools.  
Discussion 
The capacity of education markets to boost school segregation is well documented in the literature. 
Beyond impact evaluations, mechanism-based comparative analyses offer useful insight to 
understand how the relationship between education markets and school segregation works. They 
provide information to make evidence-informed decisions and to answer an emerging question in 
international debates: is it possible to balance education markets and equity? (OECD 2017). 
From the mechanisms presented in this paper and the evidence reviewed, two main 
conclusions can be drawn. First, the relationship between education markets and school segregation 
is complex, multidimensional and frequently overcomes what the ontology of these policies predicts. 
Families use market mechanisms not only to meet their educational preferences or to maximise the 
level of educational quality for their children, but also to ensure social closure or isolation from other 
social groups. In the case of educational providers, education markets tend to incentivise strategies 
of student selection or the formation of market niches usually based on social class codes and symbolic 
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attributes. Second, market-oriented policies are prone to exacerbate social class differences in the 
education field. Although the activation of individual actions explains the final transformational 
mechanism that produces school segregation, these individual mechanisms are clearly socially 
mediated. As it has been argued before, education markets facilitate processes of emulation among 
social groups or the possibility to share schooling with peers from similar social backgrounds.      
However, the evidence reviewed also shows that the presence and the role of the three 
identified mechanisms are mediated by the regulatory frameworks, the social and educational 
contexts and the historical paths followed by each education market. For instance, in education 
markets where choice is more restricted due to the presence of controlled choice regulation, the 
dynamics of social closure or colonisation can be the more powerful mechanism to explain processes 
of school segregation. In contrast, in contexts with higher levels of school choice and where 
competition between schools plays an important role, the emergence of student selection processes 
or the process of white flight are more likely. High levels of school autonomy and incentives for school 
diversification also give more manoeuvrability to schools to develop processes of indirect selection of 
self-exclusion.  
In the past few years, many international and national actors have raised their concerns 
regarding the relationship between pro-market policies and inequalities, particularly in terms of 
school segregation. In this respect, many of these actors are betting on regulatory frameworks and 
accountability policies as a means to make compatible the supposed benefits of education markets 
and equity (World Bank 2018; OECD 2019, 2017). The social mechanism approach developed to 
explore the effects of education markets on school segregation produces relevant conclusions in this 
regard. The capacity of regulation to inhibit the ‘opportunistic’ or unexpected behaviours of some 
social groups or educational providers is relatively limited. Frequently, situational mechanisms such 
as choice or competition are altered in their original purpose by the way actors enact them. The 
second limit refers to accountability devices. Usually, policy proposals consider that the lack of proper 
accountability schemes explains the capacity of actors to develop unintended responses to market 
policies. However, in many cases, the presence of accountability devices seems to be insufficient to 
avoid responses that contribute to school segregation.  
In summary, mechanism-based analytical approaches can contribute not just to 
understanding the impact that education market reforms can have on school segregation, but also to 
understanding the causality of this relationship in different social contexts. National case studies and 
comparative research on education markets are needed to understand why, how and under what 
circumstances the three identified mechanisms are more or less present and more or less intense. The 
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findings of this type of research may provide policymakers with a solid base to know how specific 
policies operate in real contexts and how the expected effects may be confirmed or altered by actors’ 
enactment. In fact, policymakers do not normally make their decisions based on social mechanisms 
explanations but on policy learning or policy borrowing, which are much more common practices in 
policy design and educational reform. There is an interesting potential in the approach developed in 
this article. Understanding how actors respond to specific circumstances is necessary if effective 
policies are to be designed to improve education and social equity.   
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